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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
perhaps incorrectly, stated the criterion to be used when picketing is carried
on for an unlawful objective or by unlawful means, thus losing its protection
under Section 7.12 This does not, however, detract from the Court's achieve-
ment of its main objective in establishing and expounding the Garmon case
doctrine as the guiding principle for preemption cases in labor disputes in-
volving interstate commerce in New York.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
MIVUNICIPALITY CAN WAIvE A CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION ON BRINGING ACTION
In a contract action by a building contractor against a municipal corpora-
tion, Planet Construction Corp. v. Board of Education of The City of New York,1
for extra labor and materials allegedly furnished in connection with a con-
struction contract, the Court of Appeals in a four to three decision held, that
even though the contract contained a provision limiting time for commence-
ment of action on the contract to one year, and although the action was not
brought within that time, the judge at Special Term erred in granting summary
judgment for the defendant, Board of Education. Defendant's issuing of a
change order after the one-year period of the contract limitation and deducting
from the amount due under the contract at a time when it claimed plaintiff
had lost its right to sue presented triable issues as to waiver of the contract
limitation or estoppel to assert the contract limitation.
By statute,2 a municipal corporation is forbidden to waive the defense of
the Statute of Limitations.3 In erroneously granting summary judgment,
Special Term, and the Appellate Division,4 held that because of defendant's
unique position as a municipal corporation, it could not waive the contract
provision limiting action on the contract to one year and hence defendant could
12. The Court of Appeals states that the conduct involved in the instant case might
lose its protection under § 7 if it was carried on for an unlawful objective, and hence be
subject to a state court injunction. The Court felt that the attempt on the part of the
minority union to force recognition and thus to cause the employer to break his contract
with the majority union was conduct that a state might enjoin. This would be erroneous
for the state may only act where such conduct involves violence, (N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel,
306 U.S. 240---sit down strike) or an unlawful objective (Southern S.S. Co. v. N.L.R.B.
316 U.S. 31-mutiny). This is not the type of conduct involved in the instant case nor
even approaching it. These are areas for the proper exercise of the police power, not labor
regulation.
1. 7 N.Y.2d 381, 198 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1960).
2. N.Y. General City Law § 20(5) authorizes a municipality:
To spend money for any public or municipal purpose; to pay or compromise
claims equitably, payable by the city, though not constituting obligations legally
.binding on it, but it shall have no power to waive the defense of the statute of
limitations or to grant extra compensation to any public officer, servant or con-
tractor. (Emphasis added.)
3. Six years is the ordinary limit for bringing an action on a contract [N.Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 48()].
4. 8 A.D.2d 781, 187 N.YS.2d 979 (1st Dep't 1959).
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not be estopped from asserting the provision as a complete bar to plaintiff con-
tractor's action.
The Statute of Limitations, however, does not apply when a shorter limita-
tion is prescribed by the written contract of the parties,5 and while that shorter
limitation is still in effect. Thus in a similar situation, Soviero Bros. Contracting
Corp. v. City of New York, 6 the city successfully took advantage of a contract
provision limiting the time for bringing an action on the contract to one year.
This type of contract provision can operate to the advantage of either party
and, standing on no different ground than any other provision in the contract,
may be waived by the action of a party to the contract either expressly or im-
pliedly. Moreover, an estoppel may arise against a municipality the same as
any other person.
7
The decision in the instant case, Planet Construction Corp. v. Board
of Education of The City of New York,8 represents a refusal by the Court of
Appeals to extend to privately and individually negotiated limitations the policy
considerations which prompted the Legislature to prohibit a municipal corpora-
tion from waiving or being estopped from asserting the general provisions of the
Statute of Limitations. In the present case the Statute will still limit the time
within which the plaintiff can commence an action. Thus the pocket book of a
municipality and ultimately its taxpayers is protected from the over-generosity
or incompetence of its officials to the extent that they may not deprive a
municipality of the benefit of the Statute of Limitations itself. However, in
placing a municipality on the same footing as anyone else in so far as contract
provisions for a shorter period of limitation are concerned, the municipality
and the taxpayer are to that extent deprived of some protection. This is not
necessarily a bad state of affairs, for, although the municipal officials are not
allowed to challenge or evade the wisdom of the Legislature in setting up the
extreme limit for bringing of an action, i.e., the Statute of Limitations, they
may, albeit sometimes inadvertantly, waive those private and individual -limita-
tions set up by themselves and another party in the course of negotiating an
individual contract. -Since the source of the limitation is the will of the
contracting parties, and not that of the Legislature, as in the case of Statute of
Limitations, it seems far from inequitable that the parties to the contract
may by mutual agreement, waiver, or estoppel alter this type of contract
provision just as they might alter any other contract provision.
CoNTRIBUTIoN DEFIcrENciEs TO CITY PENSION FUND DUE TO EXTENSION OF
BENExrrs
Plaintiffs in Dunn v. City of New York9 are members of the fire depart-
S. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 10(1).
6. 286 App. Div. 435, 142 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1st Dep't 1955).
7. Buffalo Library v. Wanamaker, 162 Misc. 26, 293 N.Y. Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
8. Supra note 1.
9. 7 N.Y.2d 232, 196 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1959).
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